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The alms given to a naked man in the street do not fulfill the
obligations of the state, which owes to every citizen a certain
subsistence, a proper nourishment, convenient clothing, and a kind
of life not incompatible with health.1
This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength,
under the protection of certain inalienable political rights-among them the
right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our rights to life and liberty.

I Karl N. Llewellyn

Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to many people for
valuable comments and discussions, including Jack Goldsmith, Michael Ignatieff, Martha
Nussbaum, Eric Posner, and Richard Posner, and participants in workshops at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government and at the University of Chicago Law School. This essay
greatly overlaps with my essay, intended for a different audience, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
1. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. XXIII, ch. 29, at 25
(Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1949) (1748).
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As our Nation has grown in size and stature, however-as our
industrial economy expanded-these political rights proved inadequate to
assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness....
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a
new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all-regardless
of station, race, or creed.
Among these are:
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops
or farms or mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return
which will give him and his family a decent living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by
monopolies at home or abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve
and enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age,
sickness, accident, and unemployment;
The right to a good education....
I ask the Congress to explore the means for implementing this
economic bill of rights-for it is definitely the responsibility of the
2
Congress so to do.
INTRODUCTION

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects a wide range of
social and economic rights. 3 It proclaims, for example, that "[e]veryone
has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. ' '4 It also
provides a "right to equal pay for equal work," a "right to form and to join
trade unions for the protection of his interests," and a "right to just and
favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence
2. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11,
1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 40-42

(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
3. See generally Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
4. Id. art. 23(1).

HeinOnline -- 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 2 2005-2006

20051

American Constitution

worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means
of social protection." 5 More broadly still, the Declaration proclaims that
everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control. 6
The Declaration also provides a "right to education" and a "right to
7
social security."
The International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights
follows the Declaration in creating social and economic rights, as do many8
constitutions, which guarantee citizens a wide range of social entitlements.
Of course, this was true for the Soviet Constitution. 9 But many noncommunist and post-communist constitutions contain these rights as well.
The Constitution of Norway imposes on the state the responsibility "to
create conditions enabling every person capable of work to earn a living by
his work."' 10 The Romanian Constitution includes the right to work, the
right to equal pay for equal work, and measures for the protection and
safety of workers.'" The Constitution of Peru announces, "The worker has
the right to an equitable and sufficient remuneration, that procures, for him
and his family material and spiritual welfare."' 12 The Syrian Constitution13
proclaims that "[t]he state undertakes to provide work for all citizens."
The Bulgarian Constitution offers the right to work, the right to labor
safety, the right to social security, and the right to free medical care. 14 The
Hungarian Constitution proclaims, "People living within the territory of the
Republic of Hungary have the right to the highest possible level of physical

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. art. 23(2)-(4).
Id. art. 25(1).
Id. arts. 22, 26(1).

MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 359 (1995).
9. See U.S.S.R. CONST of 1977. ch. 7 (The Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of
Citizens of the U.S.S.R.).
10. NOR. CONST. pt. E (General Provisions), art. 110.
11. RoM. CONST. tit. H1 (Fundamental Rights, Freedoms, & Duties), ch. II
(Fundamental Rights and Freedoms), arts. 38(1), (2), (4).
12. PERU CONST. tit. I (The Person and Society), ch. II. (Social and Economic Rights),
art. 24.
13. SYRIA CONST. ch. I (Basic Principles), pt. IV (Freedoms, Rights, Duties), art. 36(1).
14. BULG. CONST. ch. II (Fundamental Rights and Obligations of Citizens), arts. 48(1),
48(5), 51(l), 52(l).
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and mental health."' 5 It also provides that "[e]veryone who works has the
right to emolument
that corresponds to the amount and quality of the work
16
performed."'
Not every modem constitution creates rights of this sort; such rights
are entirely absent from a number of contemporary constitutions. Indeed,
some nations recognize such rights, but in a way that seems to make them
goals and not rights at all. The Constitution of Switzerland, for example,
says that "[t]he Confederation and the Cantons shall strive to ensure"
17
certain rights, including social security, necessary health care, and more.
The Constitution of India offers a range of civil and political rights, and
also offers "Directive Principles of State Policy," saying that "[t]he State
shall... direct its policy towards securing" certain rights, including "an
adequate means of livelihood," "equal pay for equal work for both men and
women," and more. 18 This strategy is taken as well in the constitutions of
Ireland, Nigeria, and Papua New Guinea. 19 The South African Constitution
recognizes a wide range of social and economic rights, but also
acknowledges resource constraints, typically obliging the state to "take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realisation of' the relevant right. 20 Provisions of
this kind are ambiguous, but they have been held to be justiciable, obliging
21
the government not to default in its basic obligations.
I am concerned here with a particular puzzle. The constitutions of
most nations create social and economic rights, whether or not they are
enforceable, but the American Constitution does nothing of the kind. Why
is this? What makes the American Constitution so distinctive in this
regard?
I will explore four possible answers here. 22 In the process I hope to
cast some light on the effects of constitutions, cultural differences, and
social and economic guarantees in general. The first explanation is
chronological; it points simply to the age of the American Constitution,
15. HUNG. CONST. ch. XII (Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens), art. 701D(1).
16. Id. art. 70/B(3).
17. SWITZ. CONST. tit. II (Fundamental Rights, Civil Rights and Social Goals), ch. III
(Social Goals), art. 41(1), 41(1)(a)-(b).
18. INDIA CONST. pt. IV (Directive Principles of State Policy), art. 39, 39(a), (d).
19. See IR. CONST. ch. XIII (Directive Principles of Social Policy), art. 45; NIG. CONST.
ch. II (Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy), art. 17(3)(a), (e);
PAPUA N.G. CONST. pmbl. para. 2.

20. S.AFR.CONST. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), §§ 26(2), 27(2).
21. See Gov't of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) at
19-20.
22. The issues explored in this article are discussed in more detail in CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004).
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which is the oldest in force in the world. The second, institutional in
nature, emphasizes that social and economic rights cannot easily coexist
with judicial review, a preoccupation of the American legal culture. The
third explanation points to "American exceptionalism," as it is standardly
understood: the absence of a significant socialist movement in the United
States. The fourth, rooted in legal realism, stresses developments within
the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s. In the end, my
major suggestion will be that the fourth explanation is the most interesting,
and in an important sense, correct. The Constitution means what the
Supreme Court says that it means, and with a modest shift in personnel, the
Constitution would have been understood to create social and economic
rights of the sort recognized in many modem constitutions, and indeed in
the constitutions of some of the American states.
An additional word before we proceed: to evaluate the four
explanations, it is important to distinguish between necessary and sufficient
conditions for the recognition of social and economic rights. Judicial
interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision is a sufficient
condition, though not a necessary one. Ratification of an explicit provision
is a sufficient condition, though not a necessary one. I am concerned here
to explore both the failure of a serious ratification effort and the absence of
a judicial interpretation that would recognize social and economic rights.
This article is organized as follows. Part I offers some conceptual
preliminaries. My goal here is to challenge the claim of a sharp dichotomy
between traditional constitutional rights and social and economic rights by
showing that both of these depend on an active government, and indeed on
the expenditure of taxpayer funds. Part II explores the chronological
explanation. Part III briefly discusses the amendment process and also the
New Deal period, in which social and economic guarantees received
prominent public attention. Part IV examines institutional considerations.
Part V investigates the cultural explanation. Part VI explores developments
in the 1960s and 1970s, suggesting that the Court came close to
understanding the Constitution to create social and economic rights, and
that with slight differences in personnel, the Court would have done exactly
that. The final part is a brief conclusion.
I. CONCEPTUAL PRELIMINARIES
What is distinctive about social and economic rights? What makes
them unusual? The conventional answer is that while ordinary rights create
"negative" checks on government, preserving a sphere of private immunity,
social and economic rights impose "positive" obligations on government,
creating a set of private entitlements to governmental assistance. On this
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view, negative guarantees are both time-honored and consistent with the
(classical) liberal tradition. Positive rights are novel, a creation of the New
Deal, or social democracy, or perhaps socialism, assimilating to the
category of "rights" what would otherwise be seen as pleas for public
assistance. In a standard formulation, Roosevelt's proposed Second. Bill of
Rights, set out as above, is distinctive "in linking together the negative
liberty from government achieved in the old Bill of Rights to the positive
23
liberty through government to be achieved in the new Bill of Rights."
This is indeed a conventional way to see matters, and it has some
historical support. Social and economic guarantees, often described as
"second generation" rights, did receive recognition long after the traditional
"negative" rights. But the conventional understanding is a bad way of
understanding the relevant categories. Most of the so-called negative rights
require governmental assistance, not governmental abstinence. Those
rights cannot exist without public assistance. Consider, for example, the
right to private property. As Bentham wrote, "Property and law are born
and must die together. Before the laws, there was no property: take away
the laws, all property ceases." 2 4 In the state of nature, private property
cannot exist, at least not in the way that it exists in a free society. In the
state of nature, any property "rights" must be protected either through selfhelp-useful to the strong, not to the weak-or through social norms. This
form of protection is far too fragile to support a market economy or indeed
the basic independence of citizens. As we know and live it, private
property is both created and protected by law; it requires extensive
governmental assistance.
The same point holds for the other foundation of a market economy,
the close sibling of private property: freedom of contract. For that form of
freedom to exist, it is extremely important to have reliable enforcement
mechanisms in the form of civil courts. The creation of such mechanisms
requires action, not abstinence. Nor is the point-the dependence of rights
on public assistance-limited to the foundations of a market economy. The
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments-a significant part of the
25
original Bill of Rights-regulate the systems of criminal and civil justice.

23. DORIs KEARNS GOODwN, No ORDINARY TIME: FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT: THE HOMEFRONT IN WORLD WAR II 485 (1994); see Roosevelt, supra note 2, at

40-42.
24. JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY

BENTHAM 297, 309 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
25. See John R. Ellingston, The Right to Work, 243 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.

Sci. 27, 33 (1946).

HeinOnline -- 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 6 2005-2006

2005]

American Constitution

They require jury trials, fair hearings, rules of evidence, and bail.26 By
doing this, and more, they require taxpayers to devote a great deal of
money to the administration of justice. 27 Consider the suggestion that
it is only because we are born into this mechanism as we are bom
into our homes that we take it for granted and fail to realize...
what an immensity of daily effort on the part of government is
required to keep it running. In terms of mechanism and trained
personnel, a system of social security is child's play in28 comparison
with the system that gives effect to due process of law.
Or take the right to be free from torture and police abuse, perhaps the
defining "negative" freedom. Of course, it is possible to say that this right
is a "negative" safeguard against public intrusion into the private domain,
and in a way that statement is true. But as a practical matter, the right to be
free from torture and abuse requires a state apparatus willing to ferret out
and punish the relevant rights violations. If the right includes protection
against private depredations, it cannot exist simply with governmental
abstinence. If the right is limited to protection against public abuse of
power, it can be satisfied by abstinence; but in practice, abstinence from
torture and abuse must be guaranteed by a public apparatus that will deter
and punish misconduct. Some rights require government to protect against
its own rights violations. If we go down the list of conventional private
rights, we will see this same point at every turn.
There is a larger implication, with direct relevance to the question of
social and economic rights. All constitutional rights have budgetary
implications; all constitutional rights cost money. 2 9 If the government
plans to protect private property, it will have to expend resources to ensure
against both private and public intrusions. If the government wants to
protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures, it will have to
expend resources to train, monitor, and discipline the police. If the
government wants to protect freedom of speech, it must, at a minimum,
take steps to constrain its own agents; and these steps will be costly. It
follows that insofar as they are costly, social and economic rights are not
unique.
Now it is possible that such rights are unusually costly. For example,
to ensure that everyone has housing, it will be necessary to spend more
than must be spent to ensure that everyone is free from unreasonable
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. This is the theme of

STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS:

WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).
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searches and seizures. But any such comparisons are empirical and
contingent; they cannot be made on an a priori basis. We could imagine a
society in which it costs a great deal to protect private property, but not so
much to ensure basic subsistence. Of course, most societies are not like
that. In most societies, the management of a social welfare system is more
expensive than the management of a system to protect property rights. This
kind of distinction--quantitative rather than qualitative in nature-is
probably the central one.
II.
CHRONOLOGY
A. The FirstGeneration of Framersand the First Generation ofRights
In explaining the absence of social and economic guarantees from the
American Constitution, the most natural point is chronological. The simple
claim is that the American Constitution, the oldest existing constitution in
the world, was ratified during the last part of the eighteenth century-a
time when constitutions were simply not thought to include social and
economic guarantees. 3 0 The American framers were building on rights as
understood in the British tradition. No one then suggested, or even thought
to suggest, that the Bill of Rights should contain guarantees of this kind.
When it was drawn up, the American approach was entirely standard;
hence the absence of social and economic rights is simply a matter of
timing. On this view, there was no American exceptionalism, and there is
really no puzzle to solve. When modem constitutions were drawn up, the
international understanding was altogether different; hence it is entirely
expected that social and economic rights are found in the constitutions of,
for example, Bulgaria, South Africa, Norway, and Russia. 3 1 Whether a
constitution contains second-generation rights can be predicted pretty well
just by looking at when it was ratified.3 2 With respect to such rights at the
constitutional level, American exceptionalism is a myth and an illusion.
B. The Second Generation in the First:Principle
To emphasize the chronological point is emphatically not to suggest
that the American framers did not care about poor people. On the contrary,
30. Of course this point itself remains to be explained. But any such explanation
would not involve American exceptionalism of any sort, which is my concern here.
31. See BULG. CONST. ch. II (Fundamental Rights and Obligations of Citizens); NOR.
CONST. pt. E (General Provisions); Russ. CONST. § 1, ch. 2 (Rights and Liberties of Man and
Citizen); S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights).
32. See, e.g., BULG. CONST. (1991); NOR. CONST. pt. E (General Provisions), art. 110
(amended 1945, 1972); Russ. CONST. (1993); S. AFR. CONST. (1996).
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some of their writing suggested a strong commitment to protection for
those at the bottom, though not at the constitutional level. James Madison,
who was probably the most influential voice in the founding period, offered
the following means of"combat[ing] the evil" of parties:
1. By establishing a political equality among all. 2. By withholding
unnecessary opportunities from a few, to increase the inequality of
property, by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited,
accumulation of riches. 3. By the silent operation of laws, which,
without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth
towards a state of33mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards
a state of comfort.

Jefferson, who was not a framer, but a strong influence during the
founding period, wrote:
I am conscious that an equal division of property is impracticable.
But the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so
much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot invent too
many devices for subdividing property, only taking care to let their
subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural affections of the
human mind.... Another means of silently lessening the inequality
of property is to exempt all from taxation below a certain point, and
to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical progression as
they rise. Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and
unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so
earth is given as a
far extended as to violate natural right. The
34
common stock for man to labour and live on.
It is relevant here that many of the classical liberal thinkers, far from
rejecting social and economic rights, explicitly endorsed them. Recall
Montesquieu's claim, quoted above: "The alms given to a naked man in the
street do not fulfill the obligations of the state, which owes to every citizen
a certain subsistence, a proper nourishment, convenient clothing, and a kind
of life not incompatible with health. ' 3 5 John Locke, of course, was a large
influence on American political thought. He wrote, in similar terms:
As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest
Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to
him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's
33. James Madison, Parties, NAT'L GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197 (R.A. Rutland et al. eds., Univ. Press of Va. 1983) (1962)
(second emphasis added).
34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1953).

35. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, bk. XXIII, ch. 29, at 25.
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Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means
to subsist otherwise .... 36
The chronological account, in short, emphasizes that some of the
Constitution's framers believed in protection against acute deprivation, but
adds that they did not believe in placing those rights in a constitution for
the simple reason that constitutionalization of such rights was a most
foreign concept at the time. Of course, it would remain necessary to
explain the reason for the rise of second-generation rights-why they were
absent when they were absent, and why they arose when they did-but this
would not be a question about American exceptionalism in particular. It
would be a question about changing conceptions of constitutional rights
over time.
C. A Problem
Undoubtedly, the chronological account has considerable truth. But
as a complete explanation, it faces a serious problem: the meaning of the
Constitution changes over time. In numerous ways, the American
Constitution has gone far beyond the original understanding of its authors
and ratifiers. Constitutional change is, in part, a function of explicit
constitutional amendments, and this is the place to begin. After the Civil
War, the Constitution was, of course, significantly altered. Here too, we
find no serious interest in amending the Constitution to include social and
economic rights. 3 7 Why not? Perhaps the same chronological account
works here as well: in the late nineteenth century, social, and economic
rights were generally unfamiliar. But in the New Deal period, the
Constitution was not amended at all; there was no interest in adding such
rights to the Constitution. 38 Why not? In the midst of President Johnson's
Great Society, and during widespread late-twentieth century interest in
reducing poverty through housing rights, welfare rights, health care rights,
and the like, America saw no serious debate about constitutional
amendments. There was no significant discussion of adding social and
economic rights to the American Constitution. The chronological account
cannot explain this fact.
There is another problem. Constitutional change is often a product
not of constitutional amendment, but of interpretation, leading to new

36. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 170 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge

Univ. Press, student ed. 1988) (1690).
37. This statement overlooks some complexities.

For a general discussion, see

generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 22.

38. See infra Part 1I.
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understandings of old provisions. 39 Even if the eighteenth century
constitution did not contain social and economic rights, the American
Constitution might well have been interpreted to do so. Consider the
question whether there is a problem of "American exceptionalism" in the
absence of a ban on sex discrimination in the American Constitution.
Many contemporary constitutions explicitly ban sex discrimination; why is
the American Constitution so different? 40 A chronological account offers
part of an answer, but it is ludicrously incomplete. The Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) might have been ratified. It wasn't; why not? Part of
the answer points not to American exceptionalism in the context of sex
equality, but to the change in judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause over time. The American Constitution is now understood to have
something very much like a constitutional ban on sex discrimination, not
because of the original understanding of its text, but because of new
judicial interpretations. 4 1 If this has happened in the context of sex
equality, why hasn't it happened for social and economic rights as well?
The chronological account offers no answer. And the example could easily
be multiplied. In many ways, the American Constitution has come to be
interpreted in ways that depart from its original meaning. Why haven't
social and economic rights been part of new constitutional understandings?
III. DETOUR: AMENDMENTS AND THE NEW DEAL

A. ProceduralDifficulties
The chronological account can be strengthened by emphasizing a
simple fact: it is not easy to amend the American Constitution, even if there
is wide support for the amendment. The Constitution moves some way
toward locking out changes-not by making them impossible, but by
making them extremely difficult. The American public broadly supported
the ERA, but it nonetheless failed to pass. Because the Constitution creates
real obstacles to amendment, immense popular support was not enough to
ensure ratification of the ERA. Even if social and economic rights
commanded widespread popular support, they might not find their way into
the Constitution.
By itself, this point appears to be a weak explanation of the failure to
create social and economic rights because no serious amendment effort was
39. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
40. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. pt. III (Fundamental Rights), art. 15.
41. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
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made. In these circumstances, it might seem that the difficulty of
amending the Constitution cannot explain the situation. But the absence of
a serious amendment effort should not be misinterpreted. The very
difficulty of amending the Constitution has a strong deterrent effect on
efforts to do so, and perhaps such an effort would have been made within a
different constitutional structure. Because it is difficult to speculate about
counterfactual history, the possibility cannot be ruled out. But there is
every reason to think that even with a much easier amendment process, the
Constitution would not have been altered to provide social and economic
guarantees. The very absence of a significant attempt to alter the
Constitution supports this speculation.
B. Second GenerationRights in the New Deal
The point can be clarified by reference to the New Deal era. This was
the period in which American elites thought most seriously about social
and economic guarantees-not with an eye toward constitutional
amendments, but nonetheless in a serious and self-conscious manner.
Indeed, the New Deal saw a large-scale renovation of the American
constitutional structure, amounting to a kind of second American
Revolution. 4 2 The renovation involved the three cornerstones of that
structure: federalism, checks and balances, and individual rights. 43 It is
well-known that the powers of the national government significantly
increased, and a great deal of authority was concentrated in the presidency.
What is less well-known is the nature of the New Deal's renovation of preexisting understandings of legal rights. Before the New Deal, the
American legal culture defined "rights" largely in terms of the eighteenth
century catalogue of the common law; hence freedom of contract and
private property were prominent illustrations of rights protected from
governmental incursion.
The New Dealers believed that the common law catalogue included
too much and too little. A large part of their argument was an effort to
denaturalize the common law. In their view, rights of freedom of contract
and private property depended on a legal apparatus for their existence; they
were hardly natural, but rather resulted from a form of governmental
intervention into private affairs. Thus, Roosevelt urged, "We must lay hold
of the fact that economic laws are not made by nature. They are made by
human beings. ''44 This claim did not mean that freedom of contract and
42. Or perhaps third if we include the Civil War Amendments.
43. For more detail, see generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 22.
44. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech Before the 1932 Democratic National Convention
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private property were bad ideas, but it did mean that they should be
evaluated pragmatically and in terms of what they did for, or to, the human
beings subject to them. And on this count, the New Dealers supported
many readjustments of common law interests. Rights to governmental
protection within the employment market, for example, were insufficiently
protected by the common law, as were the interests of the poor, consumers
of dangerous food and drugs, the elderly, traders on securities markets, and
victims of unfair trade practices.
This basic theme, the central ingredient of New Deal
constitutionalism, was prominent throughout Roosevelt's presidency. In
his speech accepting the Democratic nomination for the presidency in
1936, for example, Roosevelt argued that although the constitutional
framers were concerned only with political rights, new circumstances
required the recognition of economic rights as well because "freedom is no
half-and-half affair." 4 5 The most dramatic statement of this revised notion
of entitlement came in President Roosevelt's State of the Union address of
1944, which set forth the "Second Bill of Rights," quoted as the epigraph to
46
this essay.
In coming to terms with Roosevelt's proposal, three points are worth
emphasizing. The first is the sheer amplitude of the relevant rights,
including most of what can be found in the Universal Declaration and in
contemporary constitutions. 4 7 The second is Roosevelt's insistence that the
relevant rights had already been "accepted," post-New Deal-that they
reflected the nation's official creed in 1944, and hence represented no new
innovation. 4 8 The third is that Roosevelt proposed no constitutional
amendment, and no judicial role, but instead an effort by Congress to
"explore the means for implementing this economic bill of rights." 4 9 It
should be noted in this regard that at the state level, constitutional
amendments were ratified, endorsing aspects of the Second Bill of Rights
as a matter of state constitutional law. Indeed, a number of states now offer

(July 2, 1932), in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 27 (John Gabriel Hunt ed.,

1995).
45. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency (June
27, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 234
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
46. See Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 40-42.
47. Compare id. at 41, with BULG. CONST. ch. II (Fundamental Rights and Obligations
of Citizens); NOR. CONST. pt. E (General Provisions); PERU CONST. tit. I (The Person and

Society), ch. II (Social and Economic Rights); SYRIA CONST. ch. I (Basic Principles), pt. IV
(Freedoms, Rights, Duties); UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note 3.
48. See Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 41.
49. Id. at 42.
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some constitutional declaration of social and economic rights. The New
York Constitution is exemplary: "The aid, care, and support of the needy
are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its
subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may
from time to time determine." 50 The claim of large-scale American
exceptionalism as a cultural matter is complicated not only by Roosevelt's
plea for a Second Bill of Rights, but also by the existence of considerable
constitutional innovation at the state level-activity that has not, by the
way, made much difference in terms of actual lives of poor people.
But for present purposes, the crucial point is that the New Dealers did
not pursue constitutional reform. Their approach on this count is fully
consistent with their general strategy, which was to avoid official
amendments entirely, and to use political processes and constitutional
interpretation to move in the directions that they sought. Part of the reason
for this strategy was the sheer difficulty of producing constitutional
amendments. Part of it was the great suspicion of the conservative
judiciary. For those interested in creating a Second Bill of Rights,
constitutional amendment did not seem to be an attractive option in light of
the inevitable fact that any such amendment would increase the authority of
judges. The point is directly related to the second explanation, to which I
now turn.
IV. CONSTITUTIONS AS PRAGMATIC INSTRUMENTS

The institutional explanation claims that in the American culture,
constitutions are seen as pragmatic instruments-suited for, and not
inextricable from, judicial enforcement. And indeed it is useful, even
crucial, to distinguish between the pragmatic and the aspirational
conceptions of constitutions.
When presented with a proposed
constitutional provision, many Americans tend to ask, "What will this
provision do, in fact? How will courts interpret this provision, in fact?"
These questions played a major role in debates over the ERAhelping to raise qualms about it even for those committed to sex equality.
But other people, especially but not only those in Europe, tend to think of
constitutions as literally declarative-as expressive of a nation's deepest
hopes and highest aspirations. They like to ask, "What values does this
provision affirm, in principle?" They see a constitution as a kind of
declaration, probably not meant for judicial enforcement, and possibly not
meant for compliance in the real world

50. N.Y. CONST.art. XVII (Social Welfare), § 1.

HeinOnline -- 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 14 2005-2006

2005]

American Constitution

As analogies, consider the Declaration of Independence or even the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was debated and signed
with little attention to the question of judicial enforcement, which was, of
course, not contemplated. And while the United States ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which grew out of the
Universal Declaration, it took a relatively unusual stance among modem
nations in refusing to ratify the International Covenant on Social,
Economic, and Cultural Rights, perhaps because of a belief that the rights
contained in the latter were not enforceable. It is important to emphasize
here that many of the constitutions containing social and economic rights
simply borrowed from the Universal Declaration. It is also important to
note that there is real doubt about whether the many constitutions
containing social and economic rights have made any difference at all "on
the ground"--that is, there is real doubt about whether such rights have
actually led to more money, food, or shelter for poor people.
If we take the pragmatic approach, we will be likely to ask whether
social and economic rights would be a sensible part of an enforceable
constitution containing the important institution of judicial review. Should
a constitution create a "right to just and favourable remuneration? ' 51 To "a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of' one's family,
"including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services? '52 To "rest and leisure? ' 53 What would these provisions mean,
concretely? What would they mean in a poor nation with high levels of
unemployment and inadequate medical care and housing? What would
they mean, concretely, in a wealthy nation like the United States or France?
If a nation failed to protect the relevant rights, would courts be authorized
to intervene-as they usually are, when rights are violated?
If these questions appear difficult to answer, we might explain
American exceptionalism, in institutional terms, as a response to the
conception of constitutional rights as pragmatic instruments. And we
might explain the contemporary practice of including such rights, all over
the world, as a product of an understanding that they need not mean much,
if anything, in practice. Such rights are meant as signals, domestically and
internationally, but they are not legally enforceable instruments. On this
view, Americans should not be thought skeptical of social and economic
guarantees in principle; even Ronald Reagan was committed to a social
safety net. The real source of skepticism is an account of what kind of

51. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note 3, art. 23(3).
52. Id. art 25(1).
53. Id. art. 24.
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document a constitution really is, and of what kinds of rights belong in a
document of that sort.
There is considerable truth in this explanation. American courts have
been reluctant to recognize social and economic rights, in part because of a
belief that enforcement and protection of such rights would strain judicial
capacities. Political actors, even those interested in helping poor people,
have been skeptical about the likely effectiveness of constitutional
provisions that might be ignored in practice. Outside of the United States,
some nations, including India and South Africa, have been alert to the
underlying difficulties, and have sharply limited the constitutional status of
such rights by reducing judicial authority. And as I have noted, social and
economic rights have served as aspirations, with apparently no real-world
effects, in the many nations in which they are recognized. It is hard to
show that nations that are relatively more likely to help poor people do so
because they have constitutional provisions calling for such help.
But the institutional account cannot be the entire picture. For one
thing, it is a bit fussy and bookish. It may be possible to justify the refusal
to constitutionalize social and economic rights by pointing to problems in
judicial enforcement; but can we really explain that refusal in the United
States by pointing to those problems? In any case, those who want
constitutions to be pragmatic instruments need not reject the idea of social
and economic rights. In the United States itself, state constitutions protect
those rights, and some courts are willing to enforce them, at least to some
degree. 54 In South Africa, initial steps have been taken, not toward careful
judicial oversight of the welfare system, and not toward ensuring that
everyone has decent shelter and food, but toward ensuring that the
government at least creates "programs" that ensure minimal attention to
55
basic needs.
It is surely right to say that social and economic rights could strain
judicial capacities. Certainly no court, in poor and rich nations, can ensure
that everyone has decent food, clothing, medical care, and housing.5 6 But
those who are committed to such rights, in principle, might well urge that
courts could take steps to ensure that basic needs receive a degree of
legislative priority, and to correct conspicuous neglect. As a result, the
institutional explanation has a serious defect.

54. See, e.g., Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. 1977).
55. See generally Gov't of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC).
56. Compare first-generation rights, which are not very different on this count. The
Fourth Amendment, for example, is violated every day.
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V. THE CULTURAL EXPLANATION

I now turn to what may well be the most tempting explanation, one
that points to American exceptionalism in general. Socialism has never
been a powerful force within the United States. America is said to be
exceptional because "it didn't happen here": there was never a strong effort
to move the United States in the direction of socialism or social
democracy. 57 On this view, the absence of social and economic rights in
our Constitution has an explanation in terms of American politics or even
culture. No group that might have been interested in such rights was ever
powerful enough to obtain them. In the debate over the Universal
Declaration, socialist and communist nations were most enthusiastic about
social and economic guarantees, whereas capitalist nations were
comparatively skeptical. Perhaps this, in a nutshell, is the best explanation
for the American Constitution's failure to include such guarantees. The
Constitution's content is a political artifact, and American politics is simply
distinctive.
Recall the American skepticism about the International
Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights.
There is, of course, an extensive literature on American
exceptionalism in general, with many competing views. Some people have
thought or suggested that American workers have had a high degree of
upward mobility, muting dissatisfaction with any particular status quo.
Others have suggested that feudalism is a necessary precursor for
socialism, and that because America lacks a feudal past, socialism was
inevitably going to fail. Others suggest that the American electoral system,
with two dominant parties and elaborate checks and balances, dampened
socialist efforts in the period in which they succeeded elsewhere. Still
others suggest that powerful private groups were quick to suppress socialist
movements whenever they threatened to be effective.
For present
purposes, it is unnecessary to choose among these competing explanations.
What matters is the underlying weakness of socialism in the United States.
There is this much truth in the cultural explanation: the existence of
social and economic rights, within a nation's constitution, is correlated with
the strength of socialist or left-wing elements within that nation. In
America, a strong socialist movement might well have sought a
constitutional amendment, or instead led to political changes that would
have produced novel interpretations. As we shall see, a more left-wing
political order would have produced a more left-wing Supreme Court, and
such a court would likely have interpreted the Constitution to recognize
57. See generally SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & GARY MARKS, IT DIDN'T HAPPEN HERE

(2000).
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social and economic rights. For this reason, it is right to claim that to
understand the absence of such rights from American constitutional law, it
is helpful to say something about the absence of a significant socialist
movement in the United States.
But again, as a full account of the situation, the cultural explanation is
plainly inadequate. The reason is that a strong socialist movement is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for social and economic
rights. It is easy to imagine a nation that has such a movement, but does
not think it useful to insist on constitutional provisions of this kind.
Consider Canada, Israel, and England, three nations with strong socialist
movements but without social and economic rights in their constitutions. It
is also easy to imagine a nation without a strong socialist movement but
with considerable enthusiasm for social and economic rights.
In 1991 a sample of the nation's citizens was asked whether certain
goods were "a privilege that a person should have to earn," or instead "a
right to which he is entitled as a citizen." By strong majorities, the
respondents answered that a college education,, a telephone, and an annual
salary increase are privileges, not rights. But by equally strong majorities,
they said that the following were rights: adequate housing, a reasonable
amount of leisure time, adequate provision for retirement years, an
adequate standard of living, and adequate medical care. Strong majorities
endorsed many of the items on the second bill. In 1990 Americans were
asked whether the government "should provide a job for anyone who wants
one." Of those who expressed an opinion, an overwhelming 86 percent
agreed. In 1998, 64 percent of Texans agreed that the "government should
see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job. 58
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was no socialist-indeed, he strongly
believed in capitalist institutions and free enterprise-but he was
committed to "freedom from want," and, as we have seen, he sought
congressional protection of that form of freedom. 59 It is easy to imagine a
somewhat different FDR, one who had the same set of substantive beliefs,
but one who also believed that the constitutional route was the correct one
to take. Why was that FDR not America's FDR? The reason does not lie
in the absence of a strong socialist movement in the United States. If an
American president could be committed to Roosevelt's Second Bill of
Rights for legislative enactment, he could also be committed to a Second

58.

SUNSTEIN,

supra note 22, at 63.

59. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms, State of the Union Address (Jan. 6,
1941), in 9 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 663 (Facts-onFile, Inc. ed. 1995); see Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 40-42.
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Bill of Rights at the constitutional level. The absence of significant
American interest in constitutionalizing social and economic rights cannot
be explained by reference to culture alone.
VI. THE REALIST EXPLANATION
I have emphasized that the meaning of the American Constitution
changes because of new interpretations. If the Constitution meant, in all
respects, what it originally meant, American constitutional rights would be
thin indeed. Most of the key tights-protecting provisions now mean far
more than they originally meant. For example, no provision of the
Constitution forbids the national government from discriminating on the
basis of race; but the Fifth Amendment, preventing denials of liberty
without due process of law, is now taken to prohibit race discrimination at
the national level. 60 The best reading of history is probably that the First
Amendment allowed Congress to regulate a great deal of speech; judicial
interpretation, especially in the late twentieth century, has lead to a robust
free speech principle, far beyond anything envisaged by the First
Amendment's authors and ratifiers. I have mentioned that the Fourteenth
Amendment, when originally ratified, did not prohibit sex discrimination at
all. But the American Constitution is now understood to ban most forms of
sex discrimination, and indeed to contain a far more robust ban than can be
found under most of the world's constitutions that contain explicit bans on
61
sex discrimination.
If the American Constitution meant what it originally meant, the
nation would have a lot of explaining to do-and the absence of social and
economic rights would be one of the least conspicuous forms of American
exceptionalism at the constitutional level. Here is a hypothesis: an
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that called for social and
economic rights would not, in fact, be much more of a stretch of the
document than many interpretations that are now taken for granted in
American constitutional law. I cannot defend the hypothesis here; to do so,
it would be necessary to say a great deal about what constitutional
interpretation entails. But I believe that I am building on conventional
understandings.
All of this is relatively abstract. Let us identify a more concrete
explanation for American practice, one that stresses the contingency of the
Constitution's meaning. I shall call this the realist explanation because- of
60. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
61. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979); see
also, e.g., INDIA CONST. pt. III (Fundamental Rights), art. 15.
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its connection with the legal realist movement of the 1930s, which
emphasized that judicial interpretation of the law, including the
Constitution, has a great deal to do with the political commitments of the
judges. The realist explanation stresses that American constitutional law is,
to a considerable degree, a form of common law, based on analogical
reasoning. It suggests that American constitutional law could easily have
come to recognize social and economic rights. It urges that the crucial
development was the election of President Nixon in 1968, which produced
four Supreme Court appointments. This, in turn, lead to a critical mass of
justices willing to reject the claim that social and economic rights were part
of the Constitution. So described, the realist explanation seems to me
entirely correct.
To understand the point, it is necessary to see that there was a serious
and partially successful effort, in the 1960s and 1970s, to understand the
existing Constitution as creating social and economic guarantees. In
several of the cases, the Court went so far as to hold that the government
must subsidize poor people in certain domains. For example, in Griffin v.
Illinois, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires states to
provide trial transcripts or their equivalent to poor people appealing their
criminal convictions. 62 In Douglas v. California, the Court extended this
ruling, concluding that poor people must be provided with counsel on their
first appeal of a criminal conviction. 63 In Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, where the Court struck down the poll tax, it effectively ruled that
states must provide the vote free of charge-even though it is expensive to
64
run an election.
These decisions emphatically recognize social and economic rights;
they say that the government must provide financial assistance to poor
people in certain domains. For this reason, it is too simple to say that the
American Constitution is not understood to create social and economic
rights. But the reach of these decisions is limited to contexts in which
poverty interacts with interests that seem part and parcel of citizenship
(e.g., the rights to vote and to contest a criminal conviction). In other
cases, however, the Court went further. In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court
held that Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania could
not, consistently with the Constitution, impose a one-year waiting period
before new arrivals to the state could receive welfare benefits. 65 The Court
relied on the constitutional right to travel, but it also spoke of the special
62.
63.
64.
65.

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956).
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
Harper v. Virginia Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966).
394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969).
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needs of people, contending that the laws deny "welfare aid upon which
may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsistfood, shelter, and other necessities of life."'66 If the right to travel was all
that was involved, this suggestion would seem purposeless.
Indeed, the Court came to give procedural protection to welfare
benefits in the important sense that, under the Due Process Clause, the
government is not permitted to remove those benefits without giving
people a hearing. 67 Hence, welfare benefits can count as "property" within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause. 68 In its initial decision, the Court
emphasized the particular nature of welfare benefits:
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help
bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are
available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community.... Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a
means to "promote the general Welfare,69and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."
With its striking reference to the Constitution itself, the Court seemed
to signal its willingness to consider the possibility that some constitutional
provision would grant a right to subsistence for those in need. In fact,
prominent academic writing suggested that the Court was moving in that
direction.

70

By 1970, it was not at all clear that the Court would not eventually
recognize a set of social and economic rights. In retrospect, the crucial
event was the election of President Nixon in 1968, and his four
appointments to the Court: Warren Burger in 1969, Harry Blackmun in
1970, and Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist in 1972. These appointees
proved decisive to a series of extraordinary decisions, issued in rapid
succession, limiting the reach of Warren Court decisions, and eventually
making clear that social and economic rights do not have constitutional
status outside of certain restricted domains. During the period from 1970
to 1973, the Court cut off the emerging development. Here is a brief
outline.
In Dandridge v. Williams, the Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to a state law that imposed an upper limit on the size of grants

66. Id. at 627, 638.
67. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).

68. Id. at 263 n.8.
69. Id. at 265.
70. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 9 (1969).
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under its welfare program, regardless of the size of the family. 7 The Court
recognized that pressing necessities were involved, but found that fact
constitutionally irrelevant, and said so explicitly. 72 In Lindsey v. Normet,
the Court upheld a state's summary eviction procedure. 7 3 The appellants
contended that the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain
peaceful possession of one's home" were fundamental interests under the
Constitution, subject to intrusion only after a powerful showing of
countervailing government justification. 74
The Court rejected the
argument, saying, "The Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document
any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular
quality. .. ,75 Justice Powell wrote the key decision for a five-to-four
majority in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which
upheld a constitutional challenge to the local financing of public schoolseven though local financing produces large intrastate disparities in perpupil expenditures. 76 Justice Powell's lengthy opinion understood the
Court's previous cases in an exceedingly narrow way, as involving absolute
deprivations of constitutionally protected interests. 77 Rodriguez was
effectively the death knell for social and economic rights in the United
States.78
This overview should be sufficient to show that the brief period from
1970 through 1973 played a crucial and underappreciated role in American
jurisprudence. The Nixon nominees rejected what appeared to be an
emerging trend in the direction of recognizing a robust set of social and
economic rights. There can be no serious doubt that Humphrey nominees
would have seen things very differently. Of course, we cannot know what
the Court would ultimately have said, nor can we know if a Humphrey
Court would have improved the lives of poor people. But it does not seem
to me too speculative to suggest that if Humphrey had been elected, social
and economic rights, American-style, would have become a part of
American constitutional understandings. The Court was rapidly heading in
this direction. The election of Richard M. Nixon stemmed the tide.
Now it would be possible to respond that that very election attests to

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
Id. at 485.
405 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1972).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
411 U.S. 1,54-55(1973).
Id. at 37-38.
For more detail about the period, see SUNSTEiN, supra note 22.
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the strength of the cultural explanation-that Nixon's election was a
product of America's distinctive culture, one that is hostile to social and
economic rights. And to be sure, Nixon won partly because of cultural
forces; his victory had everything to do with the events of the time. I
cannot explore those events in detail here. But the Civil Rights Act of 1964
helped to persuade Southern voters to support Republican candidates; and
the social unrest of the period, including riots in the cities, protests over the
Vietnam War, and the assassinations of the Kennedys and of Martin Luther
King, Jr., led numerous citizens to vote for Nixon, with his strong "law and
order" platform. In fact, Nixon's election might well be seen as signaling
the end of a period of liberal ascendancy in American politics, reaching its
peak in the domestic policies of President Lyndon Baines Johnson.
Nixon's victory was contingent, but it was hardly an accident; it reflected
large-scale social forces. Perhaps those forces included antipathy to social
and economic guarantees; perhaps Nixon won precisely because he could
be expected to support an understanding of rights that did not include them.
Perhaps Nixon was the anti-Roosevelt, and elected partly for that reason.
On the other hand, the 1968 election was exceptionally close, one of
the closest in the nation's history, and it would be fantastic to suggest that
the outcome was foreordained by a kind of national antipathy to social and
economic rights. It is far more plausible to think that such rights were a
casualty of an election that was fought out on other grounds. But what of
the period since Nixon's election? In the last decades, the Court has shown
little interest in reviving the trends that preceded that election. A central
reason, of course, is that American presidents have not sought to appoint
justices who want to move the Constitution in that direction. Even
President Clinton chose two distinguished moderates, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
in aggressive judicial
and Stephen Breyer, who seem uninterested
79
protection of social and economic guarantees.
It is undoubtedly true that America's political culture has helped to
produce a federal judiciary that no longer focuses on social and economic
guarantees. Of course, America's constitutional understandings have a
great deal to do with its cultural understandings. What I am emphasizing
here is that if not for a close and contingent electoral outcome, one that was
far from inevitable, the American Constitution would almost certainly
recognize some kinds of social and economic rights.

79. I am not saying that they are wrong; in my view, Roosevelt was right to say that
decent opportunity and minimal security should be provided politically rather than
judicially, but my focus here is on the reasons for American exceptionalism, not on
constitutional design.
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CONCLUSION

Why does the American Constitution lack social and economic rights?
The chronological explanation contains some truth; in the late eighteenth
century, such rights simply were not on the viewscreen for constitution
makers. But the chronological explanation fails for the simple reason that
constitutional meaning changes over time, and chronology alone does not
explain the fact that the countless changes in modem constitutional
understandings do not include recognition of social and economic rights.
The institutional explanation properly draws attention to the fact that
many authors of international documents and constitutions do not think
much about the question of enforcement, and instead attempt to set out
goals or aspirations. American constitutionalism has generally avoided this
strategy. Constitutional design, emphatically including constitutional
interpretation, has been undertaken with close reference to the possibility of
judicial enforcement. The problem with the institutional explanation is that
social and economic rights can, in fact, coexist with judicial enforcement.
There are difficulties here, but they are not insuperable.
It is tempting to think that the constitutional status of social and
economic rights will be very much a function of the power, in the relevant
nation, of movements for socialism or for social democracy. To some
extent this is certainly true, almost a truism. But it is far from impossible to
believe, enthusiastically, in a market economy, and to believe at the same
time in the obligation to ensure decent conditions for everyone. The
framers of the American Constitution were hardly socialists, but Madison,
the most important framer of all, emphasized the need for laws that would
"raise extreme indigence toward a state of comfort."8 0 The New Dealers
were hardly socialists, but Franklin Delano Roosevelt supported a Second
Bill of Rights, one that amounts to a match for the most expansive of social
and economic rights in international documents and the modem
constitutions. Many American conservatives, enthusiastic about free
markets, have endorsed the idea of a social safety net for all. For these
reasons, it is too crude to invoke American exceptionalism as the
explanation of the absence of social and economic rights in the American
Constitution.
The realist explanation places a spotlight on the underappreciated fact
that the United States Supreme Court came very close, in the 1960s and
1970s, to recognizing social and economic rights under the Constitution. A
step of this kind would not have been fundamentally different from much

80. See Madison, supra note 33, at 197.

HeinOnline -- 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 24 2005-2006

2005]

American Constitution

25

of what the Court actually did in the twentieth century. Why did the Court
refuse to recognize the relevant rights? A large part of the answer lies in
the presidential election of 1968 and in particular in President Nixon's four
critical appointments: Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist. In a very brief period in the early 1970s, the Court,
led by these nominees, cut the ground out from an emerging movement.
This, I suggest, is a real source of "American exceptionalism" in the
domain of social and economic rights.
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